Where the Sidewalk Ends
Extending the Internet AS Graph Using Traceroutes From P2P Users
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ABSTRACT
An accurate Internet topology graph is important in many areas of networking, from deciding ISP business relationships to diagnosing network anomalies. Most Internet mapping efforts have derived the network structure, at the level of interconnected autonomous systems (ASes), from a limited number of either BGP- or traceroute-based data sources. While techniques for charting the topology continue to improve, the growth of the number of vantage points is significantly outpaced by the rapid growth of the Internet.

In this paper, we argue that a promising approach to revealing the hidden areas of the Internet topology is through active measurement from an observation platform that scales with the growing Internet. By leveraging measurements performed by an extension to a popular P2P system, we show that this approach indeed exposes significant new topological information. Based on traceroute measurements from more than 992,000 IPs in over 3,700 ASes distributed across the Internet hierarchy, our proposed heuristics identify 23,914 new AS links not visible in the publicly-available BGP data – 12.86% more customer-provider links and 40.99% more peering links, than previously reported. We validate our heuristics using data from a tier-1 ISP and show that they correctly filter out all false links introduced by public IP-to-AS mapping. We have made the identified set of links and their inferred relationships publicly available.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Operations - Network monitoring

General Terms
Measurement, Management

Keywords
Internet measurement, AS-level topology, Traceroute, BGP

1. INTRODUCTION
An accurate Internet topology graph is important in many areas of networking, from deciding ISP business relationships to diagnosing network anomalies. Appropriately, several research efforts have investigated techniques for measuring and generating such graphs [1–6].

Most Internet mapping efforts have derived the network structure, at the AS level, from a limited number of data sources for either BGP paths or traceroute traces. The advantage of using BGP paths is that they can be gathered passively from BGP route collectors and thus require minimal measurement effort for obtaining a large number of Internet paths. Unfortunately, the publicly available BGP paths do not cover the entire Internet due to issues such as visibility constraints, route aggregation, hidden sub-optimal paths and policy filtering. In contrast, traceroute measurements provide the ability to infer the data paths that packets take when traversing the Internet. Because they are active measurements, traceroutes can be designed to potentially cover every corner of the Internet given sufficient numbers of vantage points (VPs). However, all existing traceroute-based projects are restricted by their limited number of VPs. Furthermore, the traceroute measurements provide an IP-level map while our interest is the AS-level map. Converting an IP-level topology to an accurate AS-level one remains an open area of research [7].

In this paper, we argue that a promising approach to revealing the hidden areas of the Internet topology is through active measurement from an observation platform that scales with the growing Internet. Our work makes the following key contributions. First, we collect and analyze the diversity of paths covered by traceroutes gathered from hundreds of thousands of peer-to-peer (P2P) users worldwide (Section 2). Specifically, the probes are issued from over 992,000 P2P user IPs in 3,700 ASes, making our measurement study the largest-ever in terms of the number of VPs and network coverage. Second, we provide a thorough set of heuristics for inferring AS-level paths from traceroute data (Section 3). To this end, we present a detailed analysis of issues that affect the accuracy of traceroute measurements and how our heuristics address these problems. Our proposed techniques for correcting IP-to-AS mappings are generic and work for the scenarios where traceroute VPs are poorly correlated with public BGP VPs. Furthermore, we validate our heuristics using data from a tier-1 ISP as ground-truth and show that they filter out all of the false links introduced by public IP-to-AS mapping for this ISP.

Third, we characterize the new links discovered by our P2P mea-

1Vantage points can be defined as locations with distinct network views. Because this paper focuses on AS topologies, we use vantage point to refer to a unique AS.
ally identifiable information is ever published.

plugin and are given the chance to opt out. In any case, no person-

As we show in Section 4, about 23,914 new links are discovered
through these traceroute measurements. These new links include

Table 1: Approximate numbers of VPs for topology-gathering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th># unique machines</th>
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<tr>
<td>Routeviews/RIPE</td>
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smears (Section 4). We find that some common assumptions
about the visibility of paths according to AS relationships are rou-
tinely violated. For example, while we have found 40.99% more
peering links, we further observe that a VP can even miss some
of its upstream peering links. More importantly, we reveal 12.86%
more customer-provider links than what can be found in the publicly-
available BGP data.

Fourth, we derive a number of root causes behind the identified
missing links, presenting a detailed analysis of their occurrences,
and quantify the number of missing links due to each of those rea-
sons (Section 5). Interestingly, many of the missing links (75.02%
in our dataset) are missing due to multiple, concurrent reasons.

We discuss limitations of this work in Section 6, review closely
related research in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.

2. P2P FOR TOPOLOGY MONITORING

Understanding and characterizing the salient features of the ever-
changing Internet topology requires a system of observation points
that grows organically with the network. Because ISP interconnec-
tivity is driven by business arrangements often protected by nondis-
closure agreements, one must infer AS links from publicly avail-
able information such as BGP and traceroute measurements. The
success of either approach ultimately depends on the number of
measurement VPs.

To achieve broad coverage, it is essential to use a platform built
upon large-scale emergent systems, such as P2P, that grow with
the Internet itself. By piggybacking on an existing P2P system,
one can eliminate the need to place BGP monitors in each ISP;
rather, each participating host in the system can contribute to the
AS topology measurement study simply by performing traceroute
measurements.

As a first step toward this goal, we use data gathered from Ono [8],
an extension to the Vuze BitTorrent client. The software has been
installed more than 600,000 times by hosts located in over 40,000
routable prefixes, spanning more than 6,000 ASes and 192 coun-
tries. Ono collects traceroute measurements between connected
hosts to ensure that the software meets its goal of improving down-
load performance while reducing cross-ISP traffic. Volunteers re-
port this data to our central servers for offline analysis.2 This plat-
form constitutes the most diverse set of measurement VPs and is
the largest set of traceroute measurements collected from end hosts
to date. Table 1 compares the number of unique machines and VPs
in our study and in a set of related efforts including Routeviews [9],
RIPE/RIS [10], iPlane [11], DIMES [12] and Skitter [13]. For Ono
it is difficult to determine the number of unique machines, so we
use the number of times the software was installed.

As we show in Section 4, about 23,914 new links are discovered
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of VPs across hierarchical tiers
for the publicly-available BGP data and the actually used P2P tracer-
oroutes. Note that P2P traceroutes have significantly more VPs com-
pared to the publicly-available BGP data, especially in lower-tier
etworks. This unique perspective allows us to view previously
hidden regions of the network and determine their impact on prop-
erties of the Internet topology. The following sections present our
methodology for AS-level topology inference and report on our
study of missing links.

3. METHODOLOGY

In this section, we describe the datasets that we use in this study,
present a systematic approach to addressing the challenges associ-
ated with accurately inferring AS-level paths from traceroute data
and discuss how we validate our resulting topologies. Finally, we
explain the algorithms used for inferring properties of the AS topol-

gy.

3.1 Data Collected

3.1.1 P2P traceroutes

The traceroutes in our dataset are collected by P2P users record-
ing the result of the traceroute command provided by their
operating system. Because the software performing the measure-
ments is cross-platform, there are multiple traceroute implementa-
tions that generate data for our study. The vast majority of the data
that we gather comes from the Windows traceroute implementa-
tion.

The measurement is performed using default settings except that
the timeout for router responses is 3 seconds and no reverse DNS
lookups are performed. Each peer running our software performs at
most one measurement at a time; after each traceroute completes,
the peer issues another to a randomly selected destination from the
set of connections it has established through BitTorrent.3

Users are informed of the diagnostic information gathered by the
plugin and are given the chance to opt out. In any case, no person-
ally identifiable information is ever published.

Figure 1: Distribution of VPs with respect to their network
tiers.

3Note that Ono biases BitTorrent connections towards nearby

26 ASNs (AS numbers) that do not appear in the publicly-available
BGP data and thus are truly “dark networks” when viewed through
the lens of the public BGP servers. Thus the view of the network
from P2P users contributes a vast amount of information about net-
work topology unobtainable through other approaches such as BGP

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There are three measurements for each router hop; the ordered set of hops is sent to our central data-collection servers along with the time at which the measurement was performed. We use the data collected between Dec 1, 2007 and Sep 30, 2008, which consists of 541,023,742 measurements containing over 6.2 billion hops. The data was collected from 992,197 distinct peer IPs in 3,723 unique ASes. Together, these peers probe more than 84 million distinct destination IPs.

3.1.2 BGP feeds

The BGP data used in this study includes a collection of BGP routing tables from 790 BGP speaking routers in 438 unique ASes. Specifically, we combine several BGP feeds: Routetrees [9] collected at route-views.oregon-ix.net, which is the most widely used BGP archive so far, six other Oregon route servers and 16 route collectors of RIPE/RIS [10]. We use 10 months of data gathered between Dec 1, 2007 and Sep 30, 2008, the same time period for our P2P traceroute data. Furthermore, we download AS links from the UCLA IRL lab [14] which also contain those links collected from route servers, looking glasses, and IRR [15]. Because the UCLA data does not include BGP AS paths, nor information from new VPs added near the time of publication, we combine all of these sources of AS links to obtain the most complete set of AS links. For the rest of this paper, we will refer to this dataset as the “public view” [2, 3]. According to Oliveira et al. [2–4], 10 months of the public view data should be enough to cover “all” the hidden links.

3.1.3 Ground-truth data

To validate our inferred AS links, we use router configurations and sylogs from a tier-1 ISP as ground-truth connectivity information. The data includes historical configuration and syslog files for more than 800 routers in this network. We simply leverage the heuristics in [2] to process these files and extract the ground-truth AS links that can be used as baseline for our validation.

3.2 Using Traceroutes

While traceroute probes can provide detailed network topology information, there are a number of issues that prevent their widespread use in AS topology generation. For one, the number of probe sources and targets required to reveal new topological information grows with the size of the Internet. As we discussed in Section 2, we address this issue through measurements from P2P users. Another limitation is that traceroutes provide IP-level views of the topology and the IP-to-AS mappings gathered from publicly available information are incomplete and potentially incorrect. Finally, traceroute measurements are subject to the constraints of the routers they visit, which can drop probes, silently forward them without altering the TTL or even erroneously modify the TTL in ways that affect the inferred path. When using traceroutes as a telescope for viewing the AS topology, one must expect a blurry lens with artifacts. In this section, we discuss a systematic approach for sharpening and clarifying this view by addressing these limitations.

3.2.1 IP-level Adjustments

Step 1. Before performing IP-to-AS mappings, we inspect each IP-level path. First, we search for those measurements that contain repeated, consecutive IP addresses in the path. When this occurs, the repeated IP is likely to be upstream from a router that is not decrementing the traceroute probe’s TTL. Such routers are effectively hidden from our measurement and could lead to falsely inferred AS links. There are other known problems such as load balancing, zero-TTL forwarding and address rewriting of gateway routers that would cause routing loops [16]. To avoid the potential problems of these issues, we conservatively remove the entire path from our analysis.

Step 2. As explained by Mao et al. [7], paths that traverse Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) can lead to falsely inferred AS links. Using a list of known IXP prefixes, such as PeeringDB [18] and Euro-IX [19], we remove from each path any hop that belongs to an IXP. This allows us to correctly infer direct links between the ASes that connect to each other at an IXP. However, we cannot rely on the publicly available information to completely eliminate such kind of false links because they are known to be incomplete. Our heuristics in the next subsection will address the remaining problems of IXPs at the AS level.

Step 3. After the first two steps, we simply convert IP-level paths to AS-level ones by directly using the AS mappings provided by Team Cymru [20], which incorporates both publicly available and private BGP information.

3.2.2 IP-to-AS Mapping

The next phase in our analysis is to address the issues contained in the conversion from IP-level paths into AS-level ones. While previous work has investigated the problem of accurate IP-to-AS mappings in networks where BGP data is available [7], our study is the first to address the problem for an arbitrary (and large) set of networks. The proposed techniques will consider the scenario where the traceroute VPs are not the same as the BGP VPs, which makes them generically applicable. Furthermore, unlike previous work using traceroutes, we expect to see a significant number of new links compared to the public view because our software monitors a larger portion of the Internet. The key challenge that we address in this section is how to distinguish the real new links from those that are falsely inferred due to incorrect IP-to-AS mappings. To evaluate the quality of our heuristics, we compare our results with ground-truth from a tier-1 ISP.

In the first phase of our analysis, we simply convert IP-level paths to AS-level ones (i.e., Step 3). The authors in [7] identify
TABLE 2: Problems within traceroute-inferred AS-level paths, symptoms for these problems, and the step(s) we take to solve them. Note that we do not consider the symptoms for “incomplete paths” because they are addressed in [7]. Reading the last row of the table, “private peering interface IPs” will cause missing hop problem, and we address this problem in Step 6 of our techniques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Unresolved hops within an AS</th>
<th>Unmapped hops between ASes</th>
<th>MOAS hops at the end</th>
<th>Symptom</th>
<th>Loop</th>
<th>Missing hop</th>
<th>Substitute hop</th>
<th>Extra hop</th>
<th>Filtering heuristic(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete paths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Steps 1, 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False AS links</td>
<td>Internet exchange points (IXPs)</td>
<td>Sibling ASes</td>
<td>Unannounced IP addresses</td>
<td>Using outgoing interface IPs</td>
<td>Private peering interface IPs</td>
<td>Steps 2, 4, 6</td>
<td>Steps 5, 6</td>
<td>Steps 6</td>
<td>Steps 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several patterns of discrepancies between traceroute and BGP paths (as shown in Table 2), each of which entails a difference of at most one AS hop (e.g., an AS is missing from the path, an extra AS appears in the hop, or a substitute AS appears in the path). To account for these discrepancies while still preserving true new AS links discovered by traceroute measurements, we mark a new link to be *pending* if it could be corrected by techniques used by Mao et al. [7]; otherwise, we assume that the new link is real. In our implementation, we conservatively modify all the pending links such that they are consistent with the corresponding BGP paths. We emphasize that this approach prevents false positives, but may filter out real links not present in BGP. Note that unlike the work in [7], we only correct the AS-level paths generated by traceroutes so that we can confidently infer new links. Correcting the IP-to-AS mappings is beyond the scope of this paper.

We show in Table 2 that our implementation for converting IP paths to AS paths can address most of the well-known problems identified by Mao et al. [7]. Since their work addressed the problem of incomplete paths, we directly apply their techniques to our dataset (Steps 1 & 4). However, identifying and modifying falsely mapped AS links is a significant challenge that we address in this work.

**Step 4.** Besides dealing with incomplete paths in this step, we further filter additional IXPs. While we have used the available IXP prefixes to delete the AS hops belonging to any IXP, our list of IXP prefixes is not complete. For those IXPs that do not make their prefixes publicly available, we still can identify them by using the IXP participating AS list we have. We pick out the AS hops in the middle of traceroute AS paths that are publicly mapped to multiple ASes and check if these multiple ASes are collocated in an IXP. This occurs when the shared Internet exchange point is originated by multiple participating ASes. However, we cannot use this approach to identify IXP that use their own AS numbers – a limitation that we address in Step 6.

**Step 5.** A single organization may own and manage multiple sibling ASes. Among two sibling ASes, one AS may use some address blocks from another to number its equipment or during route propagation only one AS includes its AS number in the BGP AS path while the other does not. This would cause problems within the traceroute AS paths. To mitigate such problems, we download the known sibling ASes from CAIDA [21]. For a sibling AS pair (X, Y), we may see the cases where traceroute AS path is [...WXY...Z...] while a corresponding BGP AS path is [...WX...Y...Z...]. For this case, we modify the traceroute AS path to be [...WX{X, Y}Z...]. In those cases we use the BGP AS path to modify the traceroute AS paths. Again, publicly available sibling-AS information is limited. In the next step, we use heuristics that mitigate the remaining problems when sibling ASes cause discrepancies between traceroute AS paths and BGP AS paths.

**Algorithm 1:** Heuristics in Step 6 of Figure 2.

**Step 6.** Algorithm 1 addresses a variety of issues with traceroute AS paths that remain after the previous five steps. Below, we discuss how these heuristics apply each symptom, i.e., loops and missing/extra/substitute hops as shown in Table 2.

- **Loop.** Loops in traceroute AS paths can happen due to unan-
Note that it is possible for traceroute-based link $B$-$C$ in the above cases to be real – but not observed by the public BGP monitors. Because we conservatively filter out such links, we may introduce false negatives in our results.

- **Substitute hop and Extra hop.** If the DISTANCE is 2 and the intermediate node connecting $B$ and $C$ is $X$, but we could not find any corresponding route $[...BXC...]$ in the BGP AS paths, it may either be due to insufficient coverage of BGP AS paths from publicly available VPs or because AS path $[...BXC...]$ is invalid. The substitute/extra hop problem could result from the following scenarios:
  - **Unannounced IP addresses.** Consider an AS $X$ that is multihomed to its providers $B$ and $C$ and uses IP addresses from one of them ($B$ or $C$) to set up its equipment but does not announce them publicly (case 2a/2b in Figure 3). This would produce a traceroute AS path of $[...ABC...]$ (or $[...BCD...]$) while the corresponding BGP AS path is $[...AXC...]$ (or $[...BD...]$) – this is a substitute hop problem.
  - **IXPs or Sibling ASes.** As explained in previous subsections, IXPs can lead to extra hops and sibling ASes can lead to substitute/extra hops.
  - **Using outgoing interface IPs.** In case 3 of Figure 3, for example, AS $A$’s last-hop router uses its outgoing interface (facing $C$) to reply to an ICMP message (the connection between $A$ and $B$ uses addresses from $B$). This causes one extra or substitute hop in traceroute AS path: $[...ABC...]$ appears in the traceroute AS path and $[...AC...]$ appears in the BGP AS path. Further, if the traceroute traverses only one hop in $A$, then it would cause $A$ to be falsely substituted with $B$.

For these scenarios, if we can find the corresponding routes in BGP, we make traceroute AS paths consistent with BGP AS paths by replacing the middle hop with $X$ or deleting it (line 11 – line 13 in Algorithm 1). Similar to the missing hop cases, our conservative approach could discard true links. For instance, we may omit true sibling AS links.

- **Special case of Extra hop.** Though rare, we found cases where traceroute AS links have a DISTANCE $\geq 3$. We posit one plausible scenario in case 4 of Figure 3. Here $C$ is an IXP with who has its own AS number but only announces its addresses via a particular participant, say AS $E$. If $E$ is not a neighbor of $B$ (i.e., $\geq 2$ hops), this would cause $B$ and $C$ to be at least 3 hops away in BGP. Our algorithm addresses the special case in lines 17 and 18. Otherwise, we assume the link to be true if it could not be explained by this case. While it is possible for other unaccounted scenarios to exist, we believe the impact of these scenarios is sufficiently limited by the scarcity of the examples in our dataset.

### 3.2.3 Validation

After applying all the heuristics in the previous section, we are left with 100,000 AS links discovered through P2P traceroutes. We
now validate a significant portion of these links with the ground-truth information from a tier-1 AS (the number is on the order of thousands\(^3\)). Most importantly, we find that all the P2P-based links are in the ground-truth information.

Using the tier-1 network (denote \(T_1\)), we calculate the percentage of false links filtered out by each of our heuristics, focusing on those in Algorithm 1. After applying Steps 1–5 (and before applying these heuristics), our P2P traceroutes indicated thousands of links to this tier-1 AS. Compared with the ground-truth connectivity, 48.8% of these traceroute-based AS links were false. We now discuss how each aspect of Algorithm 1 reduces the percent of false links; the list of values is presented in Table 4.

### Table 4: Percent of false links remaining after each filtering step.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line # in Algorithm 1</th>
<th>False links left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>48.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\text{Distance}(B, C) = 2\) and \([...BXC...]\) exists in BGP (line 8): We see several hundreds of unique cases where \([...T_1, C...]\) is in our traceroute AS paths while \([...T_1, X, C...]\) is in BGP AS paths. Checking with the router configuration files of the tier-1 network, we found that, in 94% of the cases, the last IP hop that publicly mapped to \(T_1\) actually belongs to a third AS \(X\). These false links may happen due to private peering or unannounced IP addresses. This lends strong evidence that line 8 of the algorithm, which adds \(X\), \(Y\), \(Z\) to the AS, is valid. We further note that we did not find a single \(T_1\)-C link to be valid according to the ground-truth. After this step, slightly more than 10% of the links are false.

\(\text{Distance}(B, C) = 2\) but \([...BXC...]\) does not exist in BGP (lines 11 and 13): Our traceroute dataset contains hundreds of cases where \([...A, T_1, C...]\) (or \([...B, T_1, D...]\)) appears for this tier-1 AS. To validate this, we first used IP-level paths and extracted those IPs that were mapped to \(T_1\). Then we searched for these IPs in the router configuration files to see if they are indeed used to configure real routers of the tier-1 network. In 93% of the cases, we found that these IPs are not used in by this tier-1 network. This indicates that the IPs are probably allocated to the AS’s customers (or siblings), say \(X\). Given the data available to us, we have no way to determine which AS this \(X\) is. However, this result indicates that our heuristics accurately identify the corresponding cases for incorrect mappings, allowing us to filter out (or correct) the false links. After accounting for these issues, only 0.47% of the links are false.

\(\text{Distance}(B, C) \geq 3\) (line 18): We have no specific ground-truth files that can help us validate our heuristic here. However, the tier-1 network connectivity information allows us to estimate whether this line removes any false links. In this study, we found only 0.47% of the links to the tier-1 AS had distance \(\geq 3\). After applying the rule (lines 17 to 18), all of these 0.47% false links are properly removed.

Finally, we note that the goal of this work is to increase the accuracy of AS path inference from P2P traceroutes so that we can extend the AS topology, but we do not claim that P2P traceroutes alone can cover the entire AS topology. For instance, we have not seen at least 21.3% of total links in the tier-1 AS’s ground-truth. As such, our P2P-based dataset does not introduce any false links in this tier-1 AS, nor does it discover all the links in the AS.

### 3.3 Policy Inference

After extracting the AS links, we infer the business relationships between ASes based on the PTE algorithm proposed by Xia [22]. After improving the seminal work by Gao [23], the PTE approach is considered to outperform most other approaches [6]. Most AS links are classified as one of three kinds of relationships: customer-provider links, peering links, and sibling links. In our study, we also decompose customer-provider links into customer-to-provider links and provider-to-customer links directionally. Further, we assume that the AS relationships did not change significantly within our ten-month measurement period. To justify this, we sample the AS relationships from CAIDA [21] for the past five years. We check the relationships at ten-month intervals and find that more than 98.5% of AS pairs do not change their relationships.

We also use our topology to classify ASes into hierarchical tiers. There are many techniques for hierarchical classification, including use of the degrees of individual ASes, the number of prefixes originated by the ASes and the number of distinct AS paths seen from a particular AS. However, without accounting for the ASes’ contractual relationships, these heuristics may be misleading. Thus, we use the technique proposed by Oliveira et al. [2, 3], which relies on the number of downstream customer ASes to classify each AS.

### 4. THE MISSING LINKS

After generating an AS topology from P2P traceroutes, we found a significant number of new AS links (including customer-provider, peering and sibling), as shown in Table 3. In this section, we use our set of missing links to determine the public view’s coverage of each class of AS links and where these links are missed by public views.

#### 4.1 Coverage of tier-1 AS links

We begin by focusing on the tier-1 AS connectivities, listed in Table 5. Note that although we have uncovered 23,914 new links, we discovered few new tier-1 AS links: 1) we did not find any new links for three of the tier-1 ASes, and 2) we found a small percentage (up to 3.14%) of new links for the remaining tier-1 networks. This result is consistent with previous work [2] indicating that tier-1 AS links are covered “fairly completely” by the public view over time. On the other hand, our results also indicate that the public view still misses some tier-1 links, even though there are monitors in these networks. We offer the following explanations for this to occur. First, a tier-1 AS could contain thousands of routers, each potentially with a constrained view of the AS. In this case, the relatively small number of feeds (i.e., peer routers)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier-1 network</th>
<th>In PV</th>
<th>New in P2P</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T (AS7018)</td>
<td>2668</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprint (AS1239)</td>
<td>2293</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level3 (AS3356)</td>
<td>2774</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwest (AS209)</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verio (AS2914)</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUNET (AS701)</td>
<td>3692</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAVVIS (AS3561)</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cogent (AS174)</td>
<td>2451</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBLX (AS3549)</td>
<td>1721</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Number of AS links for tier-1 networks in the public view (2nd column), number of new links from P2P traceroutes (3rd column), and the corresponding percentage (4th column).

4.2 Coverage of customer-provider links

We now turn our attention to the set of customer-provider links discovered by P2P traceroutes. Table 3 shows that P2P traceroutes discover 12.86% additional customer-provider links missing from public views. To put this in context, recent work [4] investigating the AS graph based on BGP data suggests that a time window of ten months captures all non-optimal paths and that the public views do not miss customer-provider links in general if valley-free policy is strictly followed thus each link should be on some paths of at least one prefix. Our results indicate, due to factors such as route aggregation (explained later in Section 5.2.2), the assumption is often violated thus these public views are not as complete as previously suggested.

We categorize the missing links according to their relationships: the fraction of missing provider links and the fraction of missing customer links. We use the method from Section 3.3 to classify each AS into a tier, then group all of the fractions for each tier. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the CDF of the fractions of missing links, where the fraction for one AS is calculated as the number of missing provider (or customer) links divided by the total number of provider (or customer) links. Note that tier-1 ASes have no providers and tier-5 ASes have no customers. The figures clearly show that customer-provider links can be missed in every tier. More importantly, we observe that the fraction of missing provider links of an AS somewhat correlates its tier in the Internet hierarchy: the higher the tier number of an AS, the more likely that the public view will miss its provider links.

4.3 Coverage of peering links

Previous work has shown that the public view misses a large number of peering links, especially in the lower tiers of the Internet routing hierarchy [2, 6]. Our study finds that P2P traceroutes reveal an additional 40.99% peering links, which confirms these prior results. Such missing peering links are expected to appear at lower tiers of the Internet hierarchy, where there is less coverage from BGP feeds. However, we find that a significant number of peering links are missing from the public view at higher tiers. Similarly, we calculate the fraction for missing peering links and plot the CDF in Figure 6. The graph shows that high tier networks have relatively higher fractions of missing links than low tier networks except that tier-1 ASes do not miss peering links. We will investigate the reasons behind these missing peering links in Section 5.

4.4 Missing sibling AS links

We revealed 216 additional sibling links which are missing from public view. We think that one reason behind these missing sibling links could be due to route announcement in BGP. To illustrate this case, consider two sibling ASes: AS1 and AS2. During BGP route
In Search of Root Causes

We now turn to the root causes of the missing links. In Table 6, we present the numbers of visible and missing links for each pattern shown in Figure 7. The table shows that the public view does not contain information about either AS in a link or provider-to-customer sibling reveal both AS numbers and thus the relationship cannot be inferred. Also, one link could appear in a pattern both as a customer-to-provider link and as a provider-to-customer link. After classifying missing links in this way, we make the following key observations:

5.1 Observations

Table 6 presents both visible and missing links for each pattern. Note that the sum of peering, customer-to-provider, and provider-to-customer links can be different from the sum of links in each pattern because we omit sibling links and links for which the relationship cannot be inferred. Also, one link could appear in a pattern both as a customer-to-provider link and as a provider-to-customer link. After classifying missing links in this way, we make the following key observations:

- It is generally believed that a monitor with full BGP table can discover all the connections of its upstream providers. However, we found that a full-table VP may not cover all of the links belonging to its AS, nor all those belonging to the AS’s upstream providers (such as pattern (a) and (b)). In our measurements, we found the first 100 full table VPs missed 1096 links adjacent to the VP’s AS.
- While peering links are expected to be missing from the public view, we note that we found a significant number of missing customer-provider links.
- It is well known that many peering links are missed in the lower tiers of the Internet hierarchy and our result for pattern (h) in Table 6 confirms this fact. However, we also find many instances of upstream peering links being invisible to downstream full table monitors (for instance, pattern (b)). This indicates that ASes located low in the hierarchy are not solely responsible for missing peering links.

5.2 Identifying root causes

In this section, we exploit the reasons why a customer-provider or a peering link would not appear in the public view and provide examples to explain these cases (the reason for the missing sibling links was discussed in Section 4.4). While we cannot prove that

---

Table 6: Numbers of missing/visible links in each pattern of Figure 7. Reading column 2, 75,817 visible links fit pattern (a) while 5,185 missing links fit pattern (a). “N/A” means no link has been observed via the corresponding patterns (due to valley-free policy).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
<th>(e)</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(g)</th>
<th>(h)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of unique links observed</td>
<td>75817</td>
<td>78746</td>
<td>54869</td>
<td>55731</td>
<td>40518</td>
<td>54262</td>
<td>40666</td>
<td>52331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of peering</td>
<td>19474</td>
<td>16492</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of customer-to-provider</td>
<td>5036</td>
<td>4550</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of provider-to-customer</td>
<td>49194</td>
<td>55948</td>
<td>52092</td>
<td>53830</td>
<td>39024</td>
<td>51681</td>
<td>39290</td>
<td>50604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of unique links missed</td>
<td>5185</td>
<td>22535</td>
<td>23094</td>
<td>23909</td>
<td>23889</td>
<td>22676</td>
<td>23691</td>
<td>23884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of peering</td>
<td>3330</td>
<td>12395</td>
<td>12576</td>
<td>12726</td>
<td>12706</td>
<td>12473</td>
<td>12579</td>
<td>12709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of customer-to-provider</td>
<td>1521</td>
<td>7220</td>
<td>7973</td>
<td>10563</td>
<td>10410</td>
<td>7484</td>
<td>9722</td>
<td>10274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of provider-to-customer</td>
<td>1343</td>
<td>6852</td>
<td>7692</td>
<td>10444</td>
<td>10583</td>
<td>7077</td>
<td>9914</td>
<td>10469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of missing links</td>
<td>6.83%</td>
<td>28.62%</td>
<td>42.09%</td>
<td>42.90%</td>
<td>58.96%</td>
<td>41.79%</td>
<td>58.26%</td>
<td>45.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Figure 7: Eight patterns for the locations of missing links relative to the VPs. A bold arrow represents a customer-to-provider link or a combination of customer-to-provider links; a bidirectional (thin) arrow represents only one peering link; a dotted arrow represents an identified missing link. Reading the figure, pattern (b) means there are missing c2p, p2p, and p2c links when starting at a VP and traversing one (or multiple) customer-to-provider links.

---

5.1 Exploring missing patterns

To identify the cause(s) for a missing link, we first determine where it occurs with respect to the VPs of the public view. Our method is to check the BGP AS paths to trace the routes from VPs to missing links. In other words, for a missing link AS1-AS2 and any AS path containing AS1 or AS2, we record the route pattern from the VP to the associated AS. All the found route patterns are shown in Figure 7. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we condense a continuous series of customer-to-provider (or provider-to-customer) links into one logical customer-to-provider (or provider-to-customer) link. Note that in some rare cases, the public view does not contain information about either AS in a link found through P2P traceroutes; we omit these links in the following analysis.

---

5. IN SEARCH OF ROOT CAUSES

In the previous section, we characterized links found through P2P traceroutes that were absent from the public view. By determining why these links are missing, we can better understand how to extend our results to build models for generating AS graphs.

An analysis of root causes for missing links is particularly difficult because we lack the ground-truth information required to validate our conclusions. This is a limitation of any work on Internet-wide AS topology. In our analysis, we observe that the missing of an AS link cannot be explained by one or more root causes. Thus, we determine a set of root causes that could be responsible for a missing link.
our list of root causes is exhaustive, we believe it accounts for most missing links.

![Figure 8: Illustrations of (a) sub-optimal path to a VP and (b) route aggregation.](image)

### 5.2.1 Sub-optimal paths to VPs

The current BGP public view monitoring system has only one or two feeds (i.e., peered routers) in each peered AS, and an AS could contain hundreds of routers while different routers may potentially have different routes even for the same prefix [24, 25]. From this is clear that the public view data could miss many AS links, even those directly connected to vantage-point ASes. Further, according to the BGP specification, if a router receives multiple routes to a prefix, it usually selects one best path according to its policies and exports only that path to its neighbors. For example, consider Figure 8(a), where $AS_x$ is multi-homing to its upstream providers $AS_y$ and $AS_z$. During the propagation to the VP, some arbitrary $AS_y$, or the VP itself might choose the path between $AS_x$ and $AS_y$ instead of $AS_z$. The result is that the VP will have no knowledge of the link $AS_x$-$AS_z$.

### 5.2.2 Route aggregation

BGP uses prefix aggregation to reduce the size of routing tables by combining several different routes into a single one. For instance, in Figure 8(b), AS-20 aggregates two prefixes 200.23.16.0/24 and 200.23.17.0/24 from AS-10 and itself by announcing 200.23.16.0/23 instead. During this process, the previous prefix with the previous AS_PATH is no longer propagated and there is a new route with a new AS_PATH, say 200.23.16.0/23 20, which causes the corresponding AS link AS10-AS20 to be hidden.

Without an alternative source for AS path information, BGP paths from the public view are insufficient for determining the effects of route aggregation on inferred AS topologies. By combining AS paths derived from P2P traceroutes with paths from BGP routing tables, however, we are the first to extensively quantify the problem in Section 5.3. In the rest of this section, we introduce two special cases of route aggregation: completely hidden ASes and default routing.

**Completely hidden ASes:** We found 61 of our 23,914 missing links are absent because one of their associated ASes is completely hidden from all the public view VPs. We believe this occurs because all prefixes that are exported via these particular ASes are aggregated between the origin and every VP, making them invisible to all of the monitors. Of these missing links, there are 26 distinct AS numbers absent from the public view. However, Cymru [20] has access to private BGP feeds that may contain ASNs not in the public view, which allows us to discover these new AS numbers. Most of the new ASes (21/26 = 81%) are stub ASes, i.e., they appear at the end of P2P AS paths. Intuitively, such ASes at the edge of the network are relatively far from the public view VPs and thus more likely to be aggregated by their upstream providers before reaching the VPs.

**Default routing:** We found that over 50% of the public view VPs see only hundreds of prefixes or fewer. We analyzed these prefixes and found that they miss significant parts of the active IP address space. For example, the VP of AS8487 observes only the following six prefixes: $\{78.41.184.0/21, 91.103.239.0/24, 91.103.232.0/22, 82.138.64.0/23, 91.103.232.0/21, 77.95.71.0/24\}$, and the combination of these prefixes is a small subset of the full IP address space. For such routers, it is likely that a (non-BGP) default forwarding policy is being used to forward traffic for prefixes that are not in the routing table. We confirmed this fact through a thread of discussion on the NANOG mailing list [26]. Thus, default routing (and any other type of non-BGP routing) may prevent links from appearing in the topologies inferred from the public view.

### 5.2.3 Valley-free policy

Internet routing consists of import and export policies. Import policies specify whether to accept or deny a received route and assign a local preference indicating how favorable the route is, while export policies allow ASes to determine whether to propagate their best routes to the neighbors. Most ASes use the following guidelines in their export settings [23]: while exporting to a provider or peer, an AS will export the routes from its customers and itself, but not its providers or peers; while exporting to a customer or sibling, an AS will export its routes and its customer routes, as well as its provider and peer routes. This implies that an AS path should be valley-free — after a provider-to-customer link or a peer link, the AS path cannot traverse another customer-to-provider or peering link.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Valley-free</th>
<th>Valley-containing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>peering</td>
<td>(a)(b)</td>
<td>(c)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>customer-to-provider</td>
<td>(a)(b)</td>
<td>(c)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provider-to-customer</td>
<td>(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Categories for missing links relative to VPs (Valley-free means the links in related patterns are on the valley-free paths to VPs; Valley-containing means the links in related patterns are on the valley-containing paths to VPs).

Based on these policies, all missing links in Figure 7 can fall into two categories as in Table 7: on the valley-containing path(s) to VPs and on the valley-free path(s) to VPs. The valley-free policy is well known and often explains the missing links, especially the low-tier missing peering links [2, 3, 5, 6]. In addition to the missing peering links, we observe a substantial number of missing customer-provider links with the large-scale P2P traceroutes (as shown in Table 6) for which the valley-free policy is one contributing root cause, for instance, the missing customer-to-provider links in patterns (c)-(h) of Figure 7. All these links allow us to evaluate the extent to which the valley-free policy prevents the public view from seeing the AS links. In Section 5.3, we will quantify the impact of this reason on missing links; below, we introduce a special case.

**Partially cooperative VPs:** It seems counterintuitive that VPs cannot see the direct peering links and customer-provider links for their ASes. We conjecture that one possible reason is that some ASes do not treat their route collectors as a “customer”; rather, they treat the collector as a “peer” and thus do not export their...
peers and providers. We refer to such cases as partially cooperative VPs. Our heuristic for testing this hypothesis is that VPs in this category should not export any other peering link or customer-to-provider link to route collectors. In our dataset, we found 344 vantage points that miss at least one peering link or customer-to-provider link. Of these, the public view does not contain any direct peering or customer-to-provider link from 148 (148/344 = 43%) VPs, corresponding to 2116 missing links. To validate this result, we contacted a Routeviews administrator who confirmed our findings [27]. While Routeviews [9] asks all of its peered VPs to treat it as a “customer” and export their entire routing tables, not all the participating VPs comply for policy reasons. Instead, some VPs treat Routeviews as a “peer” and selectively export partial information from their routing tables.

5.3 Categorizing the Missing Links

The previous subsection broadly categorized missing links according to their location relative to VPs and Table 8 summarized the possible root causes under each pattern of Figure 7; here, we provide a fine-grained link classification. When categorizing missing links in this way, there could be more than one plausible reason for them to be absent from the public view. For instance, when manually investigating a set of missing links, we found that they were on a valley-containing path with respect to one VP and a valley-free path with respect to a different VP. In this section, we focus on the three main root causes: (α) valley-free policy, (β) route aggregation, (γ) sub-optimal paths to VPs. Though this is not an exhaustive list, we believe that a combination of these three root causes explains most of the missing links.

Table 9: Table of notations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>the missing links set $M = {m_i, i = 1, 2, \ldots}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>the VPs set $V = {v_j, j = 1, 2, \ldots}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>valley($m_i$, $v_j$, $p_k$)</td>
<td>the missing patterns set $P = {p_k, k = 1, 2, \ldots}$ under pattern $p_k$, if the link $m_i$ is on the valley-containing path to VP $v_j$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f_1(m_i)$</td>
<td>the reasons for missing link $m_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f_2(m_i, v_j)$</td>
<td>the reasons for VP $v_j$ to miss link $m_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f_3(m_i, v_j, p_k)$</td>
<td>the reasons for VPs to miss link $m_i$, under pattern $p_k$, for the VP $v_j$ to miss link $m_i$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Algorithm 2: Assigning reasons to missing links.

Our heuristic for determining the root causes for missing links is shown in Algorithm 2. A high level, algorithm does the following:

- When a link is found to be on a valley-containing path to a VP, it is classified as missing under valley-free policy because this policy prevents it from being seen by the VP.
able uncovered links also enable researchers to collectively validate our confidence about our results. In addition, our publicly available tier-1 links for some other tier-1 ASes but which this result applies to other ASes. Especially, our dataset contains some additional tier-1 links for some other tier-1 ASes but we lack access to their ground-truth to validate these links. However, validating with the known tier-1 AS’s ground-truth increases our confidence about our result. In addition, our publicly available uncovered links also enable researchers to collectively validate our results utilizing ground truth accessible to them and improve the heuristics.

We also note that the AS relationship inference algorithm can incorrectly infer relationships, and this can potentially influence the accuracy of classification of newly discovered links and root causes. Finally, we point out that traceroute measurements are also subject to the constraints of the routers they visit, which can drop probes, silently forward them without altering the TTL or even erroneously modify the TTL in ways that affect the inferred path. While our conservative approach to selecting traceroutes to include for inferring the AS topology mitigates this issue, it is possible that other unidentified issues affect our measurements.

### 7. RELATED WORK

The Internet’s connectivity structure is defined by ISP interactions via the BGP, which generates and advertises AS paths for routing messages. Chang et al. [1] were among the first to study the completeness of commonly used BGP-derived topology maps. Several projects (e.g., [2, 3]) focused on evaluating and quantifying the public view’s coverage of different components of Internet topology. In [4], the authors observed the tradeoff between topology liveness and completeness, and proposed an empirical liveness model to differentiate link birth and death during routing dynamics. He et al. [6] presented a framework to find missing AS links from the commonly-used Internet topology snapshots based on other sources such as additional BGP routing tables, IRR and IXPs.

Measurement platforms, such as Skitter [13], DIMES [12], and iPlane [11] are providing views of the Internet structure from active measurements. The reach of these platforms have been limited by scalability and/or coverage of active probes from relatively few vantage points. In addition, Lo et al. [28] used active measurements to expose hidden prepending policies and hidden ASes but their work concentrated more on BGP routing dynamics than the AS topology. Recently, Shavitt et al. [29] studied the importance of vantage points distribution in Internet topology measurements, however they did not investigate the accuracy of their inferred AS links.

In contrast to all previous work, our paper is the first to use a P2P approach to discover AS-level paths through traceroute probes. As part of our work, we develop comprehensive heuristics to accurately convert our IP-level paths to AS-level. Using the largest and most widely distributed set of vantage points to date, we are able to expose previously hidden regions of the Internet, identifying links missing from the public view and investigating the causes.

### 8. CONCLUSION

This paper demonstrates that an approach to measuring the network that leverages P2P systems can significantly improve our understanding of the AS topology. By leveraging measurements from more than 992,000 IPs in 3,700 ASes broadly distributed throughout the Internet, we use a comprehensive set of heuristics to identify
23,914 new links hidden from the public view. While we confirmed that tier-1 AS connectivity is well covered by the public view, our results also indicated that: 1) the public view can miss a substantial number of customer-provider links and 2) missing peering links can occur at tiers higher than the VPs in the Internet hierarchy. To further understand the reasons behind the missing links, we classified them into a number of root causes and presented the first detailed empirical study that demonstrates the effects of these different root causes on the missing links.

As part of our future work, we intend to investigate how this more complete AS topology affects other commonly held beliefs about Internet properties such as caching and resiliency. To facilitate other research in this area, we have made the set of links used in our study (including missing ones) and the inferred relationships publicly available at:

Acknowledgment
We would like to thank our shepherd Renata Teixeira and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. We are also grateful for Ricardo Oliveira’s help with data processing. This work is supported by a grant from NSF NcTS Award 0917233. Bustamante and Choffnes are supported in part by US NSF CAREER Award CNS-0644062. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding sources.

9. REFERENCES